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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Issues Presented
The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) provides

precedent for cases presented to the International Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). As
such, ICTR prosecutors can look to ICTY decisions for guidance on issues presented for
which there is inadequate precedent within the ICTR itself. One such issue pertains to
questions regarding reliance on material facts not pleaded in the indictment but which are
either lead as evidence during trial or are referred to in the pretrial brief. ICTY Appeals
Judgements in the cases of Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, and Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A, provide ICTR prosecutors with the precedent they need
when faced with this issue. 1
B. Summary of Conclusions
Foremost, some argue that unless a defendant objects to the adequacy of an
indictment before trial, he has waived the right to later raise the issue – particularly on
appeal. The prosecution in the Furundzija case argued this point, amongst others,
successfully. The Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic, however, disagreed that a defendant
who has not raised the issue of an indictment’s inadequacy before trial has waived his
right to do so on appeal. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument presented when a

1

Issue #2: Material Facts Not Pleaded in the Indictment – Consider and discuss
the ICTY decisions in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgement, 21
July 2000 and in Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 23
October 2001, concerning reliance on material facts not pleaded in the indictment but
which are either lead as evidence during trial or are referred to in the pretrial brief.
Develop arguments in support of the Prosecutor relying on these decisions.
1

defendant has never, prior to appeal, complained of the adequacy of the indictment
against him.
Secondly, the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence require that an indictment
include a “concise statement” of a case’s facts and the charged criminal conduct.
Accordingly, a strong argument can be made that the intended function of an indictment
is not to plead evidence of the prosecution’s case. The Appeals Chamber in both
Furundzija and Kupreskic agree that an indictment only needs to contain material facts
underpinning the charges therein and that it does not need to present evidence that will be
presented in support of those material facts.
In addition, when evidence that is offered at trial addresses and proves facts that
are materially different from those which are alleged in the indictment, unless this
variance from the indictment misleads the defendant in preparing his defense, it will not
be considered reversible error. In such a circumstance, the variance is immaterial.
Finally, even though generic terms should not be used when presenting a charge
in an indictment, the use of statutory language may be acceptable in some circumstances.
The prosecution can rely upon statutory language for use in an indictment so long as the
wording of the statute clearly indicates each element necessary for committing the
offense. If the statutory language is clear, it is reasonable to assume the defense can
prepare an adequate defense to the charge stated in the indictment that relies upon such
language.

2

II.

Factual Background
A. Material Facts Not Pleaded in the Indictment
There are two ICTY decisions that provide a solid basis for discussion concerning

reliance on material facts not pleaded in the indictment but which are either lead as
evidence during trial or are referred to in the pretrial brief. The ICTY Appeals Judgment
entered on July 21, 2000 in the case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, discusses
material facts that are referred to in the pretrial brief, while the ICTY Appeals Judgment
entered on October 23, 2001 in the case of Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., IT-9516-A, addresses the issue of material facts that are led as evidence during trial. In both of
these cases, the defendants argued that these material facts were not pleaded in the
indictment and, therefore, should not have been considered when judgment was rendered.
III.

Legal Discussion
A. Comparing Rules of Criminal Procedure
On November 8, 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution

955 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda “for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible
for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.” 2 Article 14 of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda dictates that adoption from the ICTY was to be made

2

United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by the United Nations
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

3

of “the rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the
proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and
witnesses and other appropriate matters.” 3 Moreover, the procedures, processes, and
rules of evidence that were developed for the ICTY maintain a close resemblance to their
American counterparts. Specifically, “many of the Rules [of the ICTY] may be viewed
as counterparts or parallels to U.S. Federal criminal practices.” 4
In the United States criminal justice system, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
7(c) dictates that an indictment “shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of
the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” 5 Rule 47 of the ICTY Rules of

3

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 14. The entire Statute
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda is included as an Annex to the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 955. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
4

M. Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas, The Law of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 864 (Transnational Publishers, Inc.1996). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 26.] Bassiouni and Manikas also state that, along with
following an American standard, the ICTY rules of procedure and evidence also “reflect
contemporary developments in international human rights norms and standards, as well
as norms imbedded in the European Convention…There is no doubt that the Rules
developed will afford the accused criminal proceedings based upon internationally and
regionally recognized human rights norms. These norms are also reflected in many
contemporary constitutions and are practiced in many national legal systems.
Consequently, in terms of protecting the rights of the accused, the system developed
offers the best that many modern criminal justice systems have to offer.” (Bassiouni &
Manikas, The Law of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at 864-865).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]
5

Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 7(c), Amendments received to 11-10-02. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 6.] There is currently a proposed amendment of Rule
7(c), which would change the word “shall” to the word “must,” in the relevant portion:
An indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged.” This amendment, absent any action by Congress
to result in the contrary, will be effective December 1, 2002.

4

Procedure and Evidence addresses the submission of an indictment by the Prosecutor. 6
Specifically, Rule 47(C) indicates that an indictment “shall set forth the name and
particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the facts of the case and of the crime
with which the suspect is charged.” 7 The ICTY rule regarding indictments is similar to
the U.S. rule in its focus upon the necessity of pleading material facts in the indictment. 8
As dictated by Article 14 of the ICTR Statute, the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted similar treatment of indictments as did the ICTY. 9 Rule 47(C) of the ICTR
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, therefore, states that an “indictment shall set forth the
name and particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the facts of the case and
of the crime with which the suspect is charged.” 10

6

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, Part Five Pre-Trial Proceedings, Section One Indictments, Rule 47.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
7

Id., 47(C). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

8

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a material fact as a “fact that is significant or
essential to the issue or matter at hand.” Black’s Law Dictionary 611 (Bryan A. Garner
ed., 7th ed., West 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]
9

See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and
Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and
National Courts, Volume One 411 ftnt. (Kluwer Law International, 2000) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.], discussing the extent of similarities between the
ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence: “The Rules of Procedure and
Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, revised as of 8 June 1998,
are substantially the same as those of the ICTY, despite minor differences. The most
substantial differences are that the ICTR Rules do not contain a Rule 65 ter and its Rule
73 ends after the word ‘appeal’ in (B).”
10

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Part Five Pre-Trial Proceedings, Section One Indictments, Rule 47(C). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

5

B. Rationale of Indictment Requirements
The United States Supreme Court has, on several occasions, addressed the
rationale behind the required content of indictments. In the case of Russell v. United
States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), the Court pointed to two protections that an indictment is
designed to guarantee. According to the Russell Court, these protections are “reflected
by two of the criteria by which the sufficiency of an indictment is to be measured,” which
are:
[F]irst, whether the indictment ‘contains the elements of the offense
intended to be charged, ‘and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he
must be prepared to meet,” and, secondly, “in case any other proceedings
are taken against him for a similar offense whether the record shows with
accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction [for
purposes of double jeopardy].’ 11
The first criteria addressed by the Court in Russell is most relevant in considering the
issue at hand of reliance upon material facts not pleaded in the indictment, but which are
either led as evidence during trial or are referred to in the pretrial brief. 12 A policy

11

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764 (1962) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 15.] citing Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U.S.
286, 290 (1895); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34 (1896); Hagner v. United
States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 (1932); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 445 (1894);
Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 431 (1913); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
82 (1935); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-378 (1953).
12

Part of the first criteria stated in Russell, that an indictment “sufficiently
apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet” is often referred to as
“providing adequate notice” of the charge being presented by the pleading. See also
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure, Third Edition,
882 (West 2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]
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concern behind this criterion is that “an amendment or variance at trial [of the indictment]
will effectively deprive the defendant of sufficient notice of the charges against him.” 13
An amendment to an indictment is considered per se prejudicial by U.S. Courts
because “it directly infringes the defendant’s right to know of the charges against him by
effectively allowing the jury to convict the defendant of a different crime than that for
which he was charged.” 14 Yet, a variance of an indictment does not carry this same per
se prejudicial status. Unless a defendant proves a “prejudicial effect upon his defense,” a
variance will not be reversible error. 15 The rationale behind this is that a variance to an
indictment “merely permits the prosecution to prove facts to establish the criminal charge
materially different from the facts contained in the charging instrument.” 16 Furthermore,
the argument has been given in U.S. Courts that unless a variance misleads a defendant in

13

Stephen Saltzburg & Daniel Capra, American Criminal Procedure: Cases and
Commentary, 866 (6th ed., West 2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 29.] See Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.Cir. 1969) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.], for difference between amendment and
variance of an indictment: “An amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging
terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecutor or court after
the grand jury has last passed upon them. A variance occurs when the charging terms of
an indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially
different from those alleged in the indictment.”
14

Martin v. Kassulke, 970 F.2d 1539, 1542 (6th Cir. 1992) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 17.] citing United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1235
(6th Cir. 1989).
15

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.] citing also United
States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1978).
16

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

7

making his defense, then that variance is not material. 17 Moreover, if a defendant has
not been prejudiced by an alleged variance, then his failure to object to the variance at
trial will result in waiver of that objection. 18
The requirement that an indictment plead the essential elements implies that the
pleading must allege those fundamental elements, which are required in order for a
person to commit the offense that the indictment is charging. 19 If the words of a statute
“fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the
elements necessary to constitute the offense,” then an indictment will be acceptable if it
relies upon the statutory language. 20 Furthermore, the requirement that an indictment
provide adequate notice to a defendant of the charge he must be prepared to meet,
requires a “sufficient description of the acts he is alleged to have committed.” 21 The
amount of factual specificity this requirement entails, however, varies from case to case
with some of the relevant factors being:
[T]he nature of the offense, the likely significance of particular factual
variations in determining liability, the ability of the prosecution to identify
a particular circumstance without a lengthy and basically evidentiary
17

Martin, 970 F.2d at 1542 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
17.] citing Runyon v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 906 (1966).
18

41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments and Informations § 261 (2002). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]
19

LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure at 889. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 27.] LaFave, Israel, and King state that generally such
fundamental elements include “the elements of mental state, criminal conduct, and
resulting harm.”
20

Id. at 890. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

21

Id. at 891. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

8

allegation, and the availability of alternative procedures for obtaining the
particular information. 22
Yet, even given these relevant factors, the consensus is usually that the question of
whether an indictment provides a defendant with adequate notice turns on whether
“sufficient particularity” exists to a great enough extent in order that the defendant can
“prepare a proper defense.” 23 Whether the indictment could have described the alleged
offense with a greater amount of certainty is not at issue. 24 In fact, “[a]n element of a
crime very often can be pleaded without providing any specific factual reference.” 25
And, it is important to note that the function of an indictment is not to plead evidence. 26
The wording of ICTR Rule 47(C), concerning indictment content, also indicates a
necessity for a defendant to be able to prepare a proper defense, considering that the rule
demands “a concise statement of the facts of the case and of the crime with which the
suspect is charged.” 27 Despite the fact that ICTR Rule 47(C) differs in its exact language
from that of its American counterpart, U.S. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), the
implications of both are incredibly similar. In drawing a comparison, it is important to
remember that international and national instruments “do not use identical language and
drafting styles, if for no other reason than the fact that national constitutions reflect
22

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

23

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

24

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

25

Id. at 890. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

26

United States v. Carroll, 332 F.Supp. 1299, 1302 (D.C.D.C. 1971).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
27

ICTR Rule 47(C). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

9

different legal systems and drafting approaches as well as different cultures and
languages.” 28
In addition to American procedural rules regarding indictment content, there are
other instruments that reflect values similar to those of the ICTR when it comes to a
defendant’s right to adequate notice. A defendant’s right to be informed of the charges
against him is also protected by each of the following instruments addressing human
rights: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”), European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Fundamental Freedoms”), and
American Convention on Human Rights (“AMCHR”). 29 Moreover, this right is also
protected in “at least forty-seven national constitutions.” 30

28

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National
Constitutions, 3 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 235, 239 (1993).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
29

Id. at 276. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

30

Id. at 277. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.] Of the 139
national constitutions surveyed by Bassiouni, those that protected a defendant’s right to
notice of the charges against him were from these countries: Antigua and Barbuda,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Canada, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt,
Fiji, Gambia, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta,
Mauritius, Mexico, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua-New Guinea, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, St. Christopher-Nevis, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey,
Tuvalu, Uganda, United States, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Of note, included
among those remaining national constitutions that did not specifically protect a
defendant’s right to notice of the charges against him were Australia, France, Germany,
and Rwanda.

10

C. Prosecutor v. Furundzija
On November 2, 1995, the Prosecutor of the ICTY filed an indictment against
Anto Furundzija. 31 In this original indictment, Counts 12, 13, and 14 charged Furundzija
with three counts. 32 Count 12 alleged “a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 under Article 2(b) of the Statute relating to torture and inhumane treatment.” 33
Count 13 alleged “a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute

31

Indictment against Anto Furundzija filed by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (November 2, 1995). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]
32

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]

33

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 21 July 2000, para.
1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.] See also Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 2 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 4.] addressing Grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against
persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva
Convention:
(a) willful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a
hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.

11

relating to torture.” 34 And, Count 14 alleged “a violation of the laws or customs of war
under Article 3 of the Statute relating to outrages upon personal dignity including rape.”
35

Furundzija pleaded not guilty to each count of the indictment. 36
On June 2, 1998, the Prosecutor filed an amended indictment, which withdrew

Count 12 of the original indictment. 37 Furundzija’s trial began on June 8, 1998. He
stood “charged with serious violations of international humanitarian law namely, torture
as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War, and outrages upon personal dignity,

34

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.] See also Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 3 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 4.] addressing Violations of the laws or customs of war,
which states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but
not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefined towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
35

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

36

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Summary of Appeals Chamber
Judgement, 21 July 2000. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
37

Amended Indictment against Anto Furundzija filed by the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (June 2, 1998). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]

12

including rape, as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War.” 38 The charges against
Furundzija were based upon paragraphs 25 and 26 of the amended indictment, which
presented the following factual allegations against him:
25. On or about 15 May 1993, at the Jokers Headquarters in Nadioci (the
“Bungalow”), Anto FURUNDZIJA the local commander of the Jokers,
[REDACTED] and another soldier interrogated Witness A. While being
questioned by FURUNDZIJA, [REDACTED] rubbed his knife against
Witness A’s inner thigh and lower stomach and threatened to put his knife
inside Witness A’s vagina should she not tell the truth.
26. Then Witness A and Victim B, a Bosnian Croat who had previously
assisted Witness A’s family, were taken to another room in the
“Bungalow”. Victim B had been badly beaten prior to this time. While
FURUNDZIJA continued to interrogate Witness A and Victim B,
[REDACTED] beat Witness A and Victim B on the feet with a baton.
Then [REDACTED] forced Witnesses A to have oral and vaginal sexual
intercourse with him, FURUNDZIJA was present during this entire
incident and did nothing to stop or curtail [REDACTED] actions. 39
On June 12, 1998, Furundzija filed a motion seeking to exclude a portion of Witness A’s
testimony. 40 Arguing that it fell outside the scope of the amended indictment, Furundzija
wanted to prevent consideration of Witness A’s testimony relating to his presence during
the sexual assaults upon her. 41 The Trial Chamber ruled that evidence would be
inadmissible if it related to sexual assault and rape perpetrated, in the presence of

38

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Statement of the Trial Chamber at the
Judgement Hearing, 10 December 1998. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 7.]
39

Amended Indictment against Anto Furundzija filed by the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (June 2, 1998). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]
40

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 6.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
41

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
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Furundzija, on Witness A by Accused B “in the ‘large room’ apart from the evidence of
sexual assault alleged in paragraph 25 of the Indictment.” 42
On December 10, 1998, the Trial Chamber found Furundzija “guilty on Count 13,
as a co-perpetrator of torture as a violation of the laws or customs of war, and guilty on
Count 14, as an aider and abettor of outrages upon personal dignity, including rape, as a
violation of the laws or customs of war.” 43 He was sentenced to eighteen years in prison,
with ten years under Count 13 and eight years under Count 14 to be served concurrently,
inter se. 44
Furundzija appealed his conviction on December 22, 1998. 45 He submitted the
following five grounds of appeal against the judgment rendered by the Trial Chamber:
Ground (1): That the Appellant [Furundzija] was denied the right to a fair
trial in violation of the Statute; 46
42

Id., para. 7 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.] quoting
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Confidential Decision, 15 June 1998, p.2.
43

Id., para. 13. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

44

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Statement of the Trial Chamber at the
Judgement Hearing. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
45

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgement, para.14.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
46

See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 21
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.] addressing Rights of the accused,
which states:
1. All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal.
2. In the determination of charges against him, the accused shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to article 22 of the Statute.
3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to the provisions of the present Statute.
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the
present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum
guarantees, in full equality:
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Ground (2): That the evidence was insufficient to convict him on either
count;
Ground (3): That the Defence was prejudiced by the Trial Chamber’s
improper reliance on evidence of acts that were not charged in the
indictment and which the Prosecutor never identified prior to the trial as
part of the charges against the Appellant;
Ground (4): That presiding Judge Mumba should have been disqualified;
and
Ground (5): That the sentence imposed upon him was excessive. 47
Furundzija’s appeal was denied on each of the five grounds. Specifically, the Appeals
Chamber held that the first ground was rejected because Furundzija was not denied the
right to a fair trial. 48 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber rejected the third ground of

(a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) to be tried without undue delay;
(d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he
does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of
justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if
he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand
or speak the language used in the International Tribunal;
(g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
47

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgement, para.25
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.] citing Appellant’s Amended Brief,
pp. 1-3 and T. 9-10 (2 March 2000).
48

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Summary of Appeals Chamber
Judgement. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
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appeal after finding that “there is no requirement that the actual evidence on which the
Prosecutor relies has to be included in the indictment, and that the Defence was not
prejudiced by the Trial Chamber’s admission during the trial of evidence in support of
facts not alleged in the Amended Indictment.” 49 The Appeals Chamber, upon rejecting
each ground of Furundzija’s appeal, affirmed both his convictions and sentences. 50
D. Precedent Set By the ICTY: Furundzija Appeals Judgement
In the ICTY Appeals Judgment of Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A,
Furundzija argued that “he did not receive fair notice of the charges to be proven against
him.” 51 The ICTY Appeals Chamber presented the following standard of measurement
for Furundzija’s claim:
Article 18(4) of the Statute and Rule 47(C) of the Rules require that an
indictment contain a concise statement of the facts of the case and of the
crime with which the suspect is charged. That requirement does not
include an obligation to state in the indictment the evidence on which the
Prosecution has relied. Where evidence is presented at trial which, in the
view of the accused, falls outside the scope of the indictment, an objection
as to lack of fair notice may be raised and an appropriate remedy may be
provided by the Trial Chamber, either by way of an adjournment of the
proceedings, allowing the Defence adequate time to respond to the
additional allegations, or by excluding the challenged evidence. 52
As the Appeals Chamber points out in its judgment, Furundzija’s trial proceeded based
upon the charges set forth in the amended indictment because he did not raise any

49

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

50

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

51

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 59.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
52

Id., para. 61. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
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objections to the pleading when it was filed. 53 Had Furundzija, during the trial, objected
to the raising of material facts not pleaded in the indictment, the Trial Chamber could
have granted him a remedy by recessing the trial to allow the defense to investigate the
facts in question. 54 Though he opted not to object, Furundzija nonetheless claimed that
the Trial Chamber had erred in admitting and relying upon evidence of acts that were not
charged in the amended indictment. 55
The Prosecutor in Furundzija stated that ICTY case law demonstrates a
requirement that indictments must contain information sufficient enough to allow a
defendant to prepare his defense. 56 Yet, the prosecution also noted that in two other
ICTY decisions, a distinction had “been drawn between the material facts underpinning
53

Id., para. 60. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

54

See Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment of
The Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 30 New York University Journal of International
Law and Politics 167, 188 (1997-1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 34.]:
The Trial Chamber addressed the vagueness of the charges brought against
the Defendant in its Judgment in the Tadic case [Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7, 1997], emphasizing that the Court
adjourned the proceedings for three weeks after the Prosecution’s case in
order to allow the defense additional time for the preparation of its case.
In doing so, the Trial Chamber somewhat diminished the prejudicial effect
any variance in the indictment would have upon Tadic.
See also Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War
Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg 172-173 (Carolina Academic Press 1997). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]
55

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 128.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.] Furundzija, in further support of
his claims, also argued that the Prosecution never identified these acts before trial as part
of the charges against him.
56

Id., para. 135. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
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the charges and the evidence that goes to prove those facts.” 57 In one of these cases,
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-PT, the Trial Chamber states that:
An indictment must contain information as to the identity of the victim,
the place and the approximate date of the alleged offence and the means
by which the offence was committed. However, these obligations in
relation to what must be pleaded in the indictment are not to be seen as a
substitute for the prosecution’s obligation to give pre-trial discovery
(which is provided by Rule 66 of the [ICTY] Rules) or the names of
witnesses (which is provided by Rule 67 of the Rules). There is thus a
clear distinction drawn between the material facts upon which the
prosecution relies (which must be pleaded) and the evidence by which
those material facts will be proved (which must be provided by way of
pre-trial discovery). 58

57

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.] citing Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, IT-97-25-PT, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of the
Indictment, 24 February 1999, para. 12 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 13.]; Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., IT-98-30-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary
Motions on the Form of the Indictment, 12 April 1999 [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14.]; and also Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-PT, Decision on the Defence
Motion on the Form of the Indictment, 14 November 1995, paras. 6-8.
58

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the
Form of the Indictment, IT-97-25-PT, para. 12 [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 13.] citing to Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the
Defence Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based upon Defects in the Form Thereof, 4
April 1997, para. 20; also citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-21-T, Decision on the
Accused Mucic’s Motion for Particulars, 26 June 1996, paras. 9-10. The Trial Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac also refers to several common law jurisdiction cases regarding
the particularity with which a criminal offense must be pleaded. The Trial Chamber
quotes, as an “oft quoted statement,” Isaacs J. in R. v. Associated Northern Collieries, 11
CLR 738, 740-741 (1910):
I take the fundamental principle to be that the opposite party shall always
be fairly apprised of the nature of the case he is called upon to meet, shall
be placed in possession of its broad outlines and the constitutive facts
which are said to raise his legal liability. He is to receive sufficient
information to ensure a fair trial and to guard against what the law terms
‘surprise’, but he is not entitled to be told the mode by which the case is to
be proved against him.
The Krnojelac Trial Chamber looks to several other common law jurisdiction cases in
identifying which particulars must be included within an indictment:
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The Appeals Chamber in Furundzija agreed with the distinction drawn in Krnojelac
ruling that an indictment only needs to contain the material facts underpinning the
charges and it does not need to present the evidence that will be presented in support of
those material facts. 59 The Appeals Chamber also pointed out that it would be
logistically “unworkable for an indictment to contain all the evidence that the Prosecutor
proposes to introduce at trial.” 60 Yet, as the second of the two cases referred to by the
Furundzija prosecution indicates it is important to remember that there is “a minimum
level of information that must be provided by the indictment,” even when taking into
account the distinction drawn by the Trial Chamber in Krnojelac. 61 To summarize,
looking to the Statute and Rules of the ICTY, along with precedent of the Tribunal, the

A valid indictment must identify the essential factual ingredients of the
offence charged; it must specify the approximate time, place and manner
of the acts or omissions of the accused upon which the prosecution relies,
and it must provide fair information and reasonable particularity as to the
nature of the offence charged.
The common law jurisdiction cases cited here are Smith v. Moody, 1 KB 56 at 60, 61, 63
(1903) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19.]; Johnson v. Miller, 59
CLR 467 at 486-487, 501 (1937) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
20.]; John L Pty Ltd v. Attorney General (NSW), 163 CLR 508 at 519-520 (1987)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]; R v. Saffron, 17 NSWLR 395 at
445 (1988). [This decision is unpublished.]
59

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 153.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
60

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

61

Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., IT-98-30-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary
Motions on the Form of the Indictment, para. 14. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14.]
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Appeals Chamber in Furundzija held that “there is no requirement that the actual
evidence on which the Prosecutor relies has to be included in the indictment.” 62
E. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al.
On November 10, 1995, the Prosecutor of the ICTY filed an indictment against
Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Vladimir Santic, Stipo Alilovid,
Drago Josipovic, Marinko Katava, and Dragan Papic. 63 The Prosecution filed this
original indictment in the case of Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. in response to a surprise
attack on the village of Ahmici, Bosnia on the morning of April 16, 1993. 64 Bosnian
Croat forces attacked the Bosnian Muslim inhabitants of Ahmici, killing an excess of 100
Muslim civilians in addition to destroying 169 Muslim homes and two mosques. 65 The
assessment has been made that “what happened on 16 April 1993 in Ahmici has gone
down in history as comprising one of the most vicious illustrations of man’s inhumanity
to man.” 66
On February 9, 1998, the Prosecutor filed an amended indictment against Zoran
Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic, and
62

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 145.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
63

Indictment against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic,
Vladimir Santic also known as “Vlado,” Stipo Alilovid also known as “Brko,” Drago
Josipovic, Marinko Katava, and Dragan Papic filed by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (November 10, 1995). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
64

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
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Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-T, Summary of Trial Chamber
Judgement, 14 January 2000. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
66

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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Vladimir Santic also known as “Vlado.” 67 Both Stipo Alilovic and Marinko Katava had
been dropped as defendants in the case. The 19-count amended indictment charged the
remaining six defendants with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or
customs of war. 68 In particular, they were charged with “murder and cruel treatment
under Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute and murder, inhumane acts and persecution under
Article 5 of the Statute.” 69
Dragan Papic was the only defendant to be acquitted of all charges against him. 70
The Trial Chamber convicted each of the remaining five defendants of persecution as a

67

Amended Indictment against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko
Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic, and Vladimir Santic also known as “Vlado”
filed by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(February 9, 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
68

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]

69

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-T, Summary of Trial Chamber
Judgement. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.] See also Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 5 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 4.] addressing Crimes against humanity, which states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
70

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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crime against humanity under Count 1 of the amended indictment, which falls under
Article 5(h) of the Statute of the Tribunal. 71 Specifically, Count 1 of the Prosecution’s
amended indictment charged the defendants under the facts of paragraphs 20 and 21:
20. From October 1992 until April 1993, ZORAN KUPRESKIC,
MIRJAN KUPRESKIC, VLATKO KUPRESKIC, DRAGO JOSIPOVIC,
DRAGAN PAPIC, and VLADIMIR SANTIC persecuted the Bosnian
Muslim inhabitants of Ahmici-Santici and its environs on political, racial
or religious grounds by planning, organising and implementing an attack
which was designed to remove or “cleanse” all Bosnian Muslims from the
village and surrounding areas.
21. As part of the persecution, ZORAN KUPRESKIC, MIRJAN
KUPRESKIC, VLATKO KUPRESKIC, DRAGO JOSIPOVIC,
DRAGAN PAPIC and VLADIMIR SANTIC participated in or aided and
abetted:
(a) the deliberate and systematic killing of Bosnian Muslim civilians;
(b) the comprehensive destruction of Bosnian Muslim homes and
property; and
(c) the organised detention and expulsion of the Bosnian Muslims from
Ahmici-Santici and its environs. 72
Only the cases against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, and Drago Josipovic are of
relevance in consideration of material facts not pleaded in the indictment.
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Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A, Summary of Judgement in the
Kupreskic Appeal, 23 October 2001 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
11.]; see also Amended Indictment against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko
Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic, and Vladimir Santic also known as “Vlado”
filed by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(February 9, 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
72

Amended Indictment against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko
Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic, and Vladimir Santic also known as “Vlado”
filed by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(February 9, 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
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The Trial Chamber stated the following facts regarding defendant Zoran
Kupreskic:
[T]he Trial Chamber finds that you [Zoran Kupreskic] participated in the
attack on Ahmici on 16 April 1993 as a soldier in the HVO73. We find
that you, together with your brother Mirjan, were present as an attacker on
that day and that you were actively involved in these events. The Trial
Chamber finds also that you attacked your Muslim neighbours solely
because of their ethnicity and with the aim of cleansing the village of any
Muslim inhabitants. We find that you acted as a co-perpetrator, together
with your brother Mirjan, within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the
Statute, because you adhered to a common plan for the execution of the
cleansing campaign in the village. This by necessity was a highly
coordinated effort and required full prior knowledge on your part of the
intended activities. We find, in addition, that you played a leading role as
a local commander. 74
Accordingly, Zoran Kupreskic was found guilty, under Article 5(h) of the Statute under
Count 1 of the amended indictment, of persecution as a crime against humanity. 75 He
was found not guilty with respect to the other remaining counts against him. 76 The Trial
Chamber sentenced Zoran Kupreskic to ten years in prison based on their finding of guilt
with regards to Count 1. 77
As the Trial Chamber found defendant Mirjan Kupreskic to be a co-perpetrator in
the above acts, he was also found to be guilty on Count 1 of the amended indictment and
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“HVO” refers to the Croatian Defence Council, or the HZ-HB armed forces.
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Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-T, Summary of Trial Chamber
Judgement. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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to be not guilty regarding the other counts brought against him. 78 Yet, the Trial Chamber
found Mirjan Kupreskic to have played a lesser role in the commission of these acts than
his brother, and as such, sentenced him to eight years in prison for persecution as a crime
against humanity under Article 5(h) of the Statute – as compared with Zoran Kupreskic’s
sentence of ten years. 79
The Trial Chamber stated the following facts regarding defendant Drago
Josipovic:
The Trial Chamber finds that you, Drago Josipovic, participated in the
murder of Musafer Puscul, that you took part in the attack on the house of
Nazif Ahmic and that you were actively involved in the burning of private
property. The Trial Chamber finds that you, together with Vladimir
Santic, were part of a group that went to the Ahmic house with the
common intent to kill and/or expel its inhabitants and set it on fire and that
you were present at the scene of the crime. We find that you did so purely
because the victims were Muslims, for the same reason set out above with
respect to Zoran and Mirjan Kupreskic. We find, further, that you were
aware that you would be attacking unarmed and helpless civilians and that
this attack was part of the beginning of a large-scale campaign of ethnic
cleansing of Muslims from the Lasva River Valley. 80
In accordance with these findings, the Trial Chamber found Drago Josipovic guilty on
Count 1 for persecution as a crime against humanity under Article 5(h) of the Statute. 81
In addition to a guilty conviction under Count 1 of the amended indictment,
Drago Josipovic was also found guilty for the murder of Musafer Puscul under Count 16,
committing a crime against humanity under Article 5(h) of the Statute, and for
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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committing inhumane acts and cruel treatment under Count 18, constituting a crime
against humanity under Article 5(i) of the Statute. 82 Counts 16 and 18 charged these two
defendants under the facts of paragraphs 32 through 34 of the amended indictment:
32. On 16 April 1993 numerous HVO soldiers, including DRAGO
JOSIPOVIC and VLADIMIR SANTIC attacked the home of Musafer and
Suhreta Puscul, while the family, which included two young daughters,
was sleeping.
33. During the attack, DRAGO JOSIPOVIC, VLADIMIR SANTIC and
other HVO soldiers, aiding and abetting one another, forcibly removed the
family from their home and then killed Musafer Puscul.
34. As part of the attack, the HVO soldiers, including DRAGO
JOSIPOVIC and VLADIMIR SANTIC, vandalised the home and then
burned it to the ground. 83
The Trial Chamber found that even though Drago Josipovic may not have personally
murdered Musafer Puscul, his active presence in the group of soldiers made them coperpetrators of the crime. 84 Likewise, he was found guilty of committing inhumane acts
by forcing the Puscul family to witness the murder of Musafer Puscul and by forcing the
family out of their home only to then have it be destroyed. 85 For his guilt under Counts
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab; see also Amended
Indictment against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago
Josipovic, Dragan Papic, and Vladimir Santic also known as “Vlado” filed by the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (February 9,
1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
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Amended Indictment against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko
Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic, and Vladimir Santic also known as “Vlado”
filed by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(February 9, 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
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Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-T, Summary of Trial Chamber
Judgement. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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1, 16, and 18 of the amended indictment, Drago Josipovic was sentenced to fifteen years
in prison. 86
The appeals of Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, and Drago Josipovic
contained arguments that their respective convictions were based, unjustly, upon material
facts not pleaded in the amended indictment. 87 With regards to the appeal of Zoran and
Mirjan Kupreskic, the Appeals Chamber held that “the Amended Indictment failed to
plead the material facts of the Prosecution case against Zoran and Mirjan Kupreskic with
the requisite detail.” 88 As such, the Appeals Chamber ruled that the Trial Chamber
“erred in law” by using such material facts as the basis for a conviction under Count 1 of
the amended indictment. 89 The Appeals Chamber reversed the convictions against both
Zoran and Mirjan Kupreskic. 90 This decision marked the first time in the history of the
ICTY “that the Appeals Chamber acquitted defendants on appeal.” 91
The Appeals Chamber also ruled that the Trial Chamber erred in relying upon
material facts not pleaded in the amended indictment when convicting Drago Josipovic
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]; see also Prosecutor
v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A, Summary of Judgement in the Kupreskic Appeal.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
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Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgement, paras.79
and 306. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]
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Cecile E.M. Meijer, Part II: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 9 No. 2 Human Rights Brief 25, 25 (2002). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
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for persecution under Count 1 of the amended indictment. 92 In particular, the Appeals
Chamber found that “the Amended Indictment was defective in its failure to plead the
attack on the home of Nazif Ahmic.” 93 As a result, the Appeals Chamber reduced the
basis for Drago Josipovic’s conviction of persecution. 94 His overall sentence was
thereby reduced from fifteen to twelve years in prison. 95
F. Precedent Set By the ICTY: Kupreskic Appeals Judgement
In the ICTY Appeals Judgment of Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A,
Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, and Drago Josipovic claimed that the Trial Chamber
erred in law by convicting each of them based upon material facts not pleaded in the
amended indictment. 96 The defendants claimed that this led to unfair notice of the
charges against them. 97 The Appeals Chamber, relying upon the finding in Prosecutor v.
Furundzija stated that:
[There is] an obligation on the part of the Prosecution to state the material
facts underpinning the charges in the indictment, but not the evidence by
which such material facts are to be proven. Hence, the question whether
an indictment is pleaded with sufficient particularity is dependent upon
whether it sets out that material facts of the Prosecution case with enough
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Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, para.361.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]
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detail to inform a defendant clearly of the charges against him so that he
may prepare his defence. 98
The Appeals Chamber states that “the materiality of a particular fact cannot be decided in
the abstract.” 99 Instead, fact materiality depends upon the character of the prosecution’s
case. 100 One key factor in determining the requisite degree of fact specificity to be
included within the indictment is the nature of the criminal conduct to which the
defendant is accused of having committed. 101
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[I]n a case where the Prosecution alleges that an accused personally
committed the criminal acts, the material facts, such as the identity of the
victim, the time and place of the events and the means by which the acts
were committed, have to be pleaded in detail. Obviously, there may be
instances where the sheer scale of the alleged crimes “makes it
impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such matters as the
identity of the victims and the dates for the commission of the crimes”.
Such would be the case where the Prosecution alleges that an accused
participated, as a member of an execution squad, in the killing of hundreds
of men. The nature of such a case would not demand that each and every
victim be identified in the indictment. Similarly, an accused may be
charged with having participated as a member of a military force in an
extensive number of attacks on civilians that took place over a prolonged
period of time and resulted in large numbers of killings and forced
removals. In such a case the Prosecution need not specify every single
victim that has been killed or expelled in order to meet its obligation of
specifying the material facts of the case in the indictment.
quoting Kvocka Decision of 12 April 1999, para.17; Brdanin Decision of 26 June
2001, para. 61.
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The Appeals Chamber did not find the cases against Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan
Kupreskic, or Drago Josipovic to be situations where the large scale of alleged crimes
would prevent the prosecution from pleading specific details of the criminal conduct
which was alleged. 102 Conversely, the cases against these men presented situations
where the Appeals Chamber thought it perfectly reasonable for the prosecution to be able
to plead the identity of the victims, along with the dates when the crimes were
committed, with specificity. 103 The Kupreskic Appeals Chamber emphasized the point
that it is unacceptable “for the Prosecution to omit the material aspects of its main
allegations in the indictment with the aim of moulding the case against the accused in the
course of the trial depending on how the evidence unfolds.” 104
In particular, the Appeals Chamber addressed the charge of persecution, stating
that it could not be used “as a catch-all charge.” 105 It is not enough for an indictment to
simply use generic terms when charging a crime. 106 Yet, while an indictment must
present particulars of criminal conduct, it is not necessary for a separate charge to be
given for every basic crime that entails persecution, as a more general offense. 107 When
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Krnojelac Decision of 11 February 2000, para. 23.
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charging persecution, the prosecution must “particularize the material facts of the alleged
criminal conduct of the accused that, in its view, goes to the accused’s role in the alleged
crime.” 108
An indictment is defective, according to the Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic, if it
fails to plead the essential aspect of the prosecution’s case with sufficient detail. 109 Yet,
if the prosecution provides the defendant with “timely, clear and consistent information
detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges against him or her,” then a defective
indictment can be fixed. 110 Including such details in a pre-trial brief could allow the
prosecution to fix its defective indictment. Yet, in the Kupreskic case, the information
contained in the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief was too general in its nature to have actually
aided the defendants in their preparation. 111
G. Implications of Furundzija and Kupreskic
Both the ICTY and the ICTR, given their status as international tribunals, are
confronted with challenges unique from those of the national court systems. One
commentator, Bernard Oxman, has noted that:
International criminal cases typically arise out of large-scale attacks on
whole communities, and the ensuing chaos makes adjudication difficult.
Witnesses may be confused, traumatized, or reluctant to testify. Physical
evidence may be lacking or may become available late in the litigation.
Suspects may be hard to locate or impossible to arrest. Those who do
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come into custody face infamous charges, for crimes sometimes described
imprecisely. 112
As both the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals have received criticism regarding the
manner in which they handle the rights of those accused, the ability of the ICTY and the
ICTR to give each defendant a fair trial is becoming increasingly important. 113 As
Oxman indicates, the Kupreskic Appeals Chamber’s decision to overturn the convictions
of Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, and Drago Josipovic, is “notable.” 114
In the case of Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, the Appeals Chamber held that the
indictment was inadequate, thereby rendering an unfair trial for the defendants. This
result, while based upon common notions of pleading requirements and the rationales
behind them, is nonetheless an unfamiliar result. 115 The Kupreskic appellate ruling
combined both enforcement of the prosecution’s duty to provide adequate notice in order
that the accused can prepare a suitable defense and the duty of the Trial Chamber in
ensuring the prosecution fulfills this duty. 116 Normally, the issue of whether an
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indictment is adequate will be seen as waived if it is not raised before trial. 117 This was
one of the prosecution’s successful arguments in the Furundzija appeal. 118 In addition, in
the United States, a defendant waives his objection to a variance between proof at trial
and the allegations set forth in an indictment, if it is not raised during trial, nor is it
prejudicial to the defendant. 119
Another strong prosecutorial argument regarding material facts not pleaded in the
indictment, as previously noted, is that “[i]t is not the function of the indictment to plead
evidence.” 120 According to Rule 47(C) of the ICTR Rules, the prosecution need only
include “the name and particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the facts of
the case and of the crime with which the suspect is charged.” 121 This “concise
statement” is not intended to be a presentation of the prosecution’s evidence to be
presented at trial. There are other methods in which the defense can gather this
information before trial, i.e. pre-trial discovery. The Furundzija court itself held that it is
possible for the prosecution to rely upon evidence not included in the indictment, and for
a Trial Chamber to admit such evidence in support of facts that have not been alleged in
117

LaFave, Israel & King, Criminal Procedure at 892. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 27.] In the U.S., when this issues is properly raised on
appellate review, “the courts will look to discovery that was given (or could have been
requested), and ask whether the defendant was actually taken by surprise, and if so,
whether prejudice resulted.” Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]
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the indictment, without prejudicing the defendant. 122 The Appeals Chamber in both
Furundzija and Kupreskic look to the Trial Chamber ruling in Krnojelac, which dictates
that an indictment only needs to contain the material facts underpinning the charges. 123
An indictment does not need to present evidence that will be presented in support of
those material facts. 124
As dictated by the Court in the U.S. case of Gaither v. United States, a variance
“occurs when the charging terms of an indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence
offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” 125
A strong argument can be made in stating that unless a variance misleads a defendant in
preparing his defense, then it should not be considered material. And, unless a variance
is material, it should not be considered reversible error. As previously noted, a variance
to an indictment “merely permits the prosecution to prove facts to establish the criminal
charge materially different from the facts contained in the charging instrument.” 126
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Finally, while the Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic finds that it is not sufficient for
an indictment to merely utilize generic terms when presenting a charge, it is important to
note that, on occasion, the use of statutory language when presenting a charge in an
indictment is acceptable. Again, if the wording of a statute clearly dictates all of the
necessary elements to constitute an offense, then an indictment that relies upon this
language should be acceptable. 127 Yet, as the Kupreskic Appeals Chamber judgment
indicates, the crime of persecution cannot be used as a “catch-all charge.” 128
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